

## THE INTER-ACTION OF VARIOUS SYSTEMS OF LAW AND CUSTOM IN BRITISH SOMALILAND AND THEIR RELATION WITH SOCIAL LIFE.\*

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In most primitive societies we find that the social unit is a small one, the extended family, i.e., father, mother, children, and cousins up to the third or fourth degree. The extended family is held together by bonds of economic necessity. A group this size is the optimum unit for maintaining itself under difficult natural conditions particularly with a limited water-supply and sparse grazing. Outside this there is no security. In such societies the system of law is dual; one for regulating actions within the group, which is on an individual basis of reciprocity of gifts and services; the second, for persons outside the extended family, is a pattern of behaviour dependent on the idea that each family acts as one, and has a group identity.

Between these family groups behaviour is regulated on the same idea of reciprocity, good for good, evil for evil; but, while within the family there is always the sanction of expulsion (which is equivalent to death) if a member will not accept the opinion of his family elders as to what is right; outside the family, there is no such sanction. In a wide empty country, where wandering groups are not forced into close contact with one another, this is not serious. Amities and enmities persist for generations, and form a readily understandable pattern, with a system of marriage exchange on one side and murders on the others. As groups develop, it is often inconvenient on economic grounds to remain permanently at enmity, and so a mechanism of settlement develops, which is an attempt to

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\*This paper is the result of six months' field work from June to December, 1941, occupied chiefly in preliminary enquiries for order as a result of incidents which occurred at the time of the re-occupation of British Somaliland. Since the greater part of the local records of British Somaliland were destroyed during the evacuation of 1940, the Secretary to the Government, Lt.-Col. R. H. A. Arundell, asked me to collect what information I could about the Somali social organization and digest it into a short paper, which is now published. The paper is intended to be of use in the field to new arrivals in the Somali country who may find the Somali social organization confusing and the Somali individual exasperating. If to understand is to sympathize, it is to be hoped that this will assist a little to a sympathetic administration of this harsh and bitter country. I have been greatly assisted by the kindness of Lt.-Col. R. H. Smith, O.B.E., Major E. Barry, M.B.E., Major A. T. Curle, M.B.E., and Captain E. F. Peck, all of whom have been kind enough to read this paper through in the course of its production and make helpful comments which have been incorporated. Such errors as occur are the author's, not theirs. Some information from a note by Major D. J. C. Walsh, O.B.E., on the history of Boramo district has also been used.

reverse the pattern of behaviour from hostility to friendliness by deliberate action. In such settlements it is usually the function of the "in-laws" to bring the two warring groups into contact. The injured group then announces its losses and the defendant group agrees to compensate. This is done by the most natural method, that is to say, by a transfer of nubile women, whose familial connections may serve later to bring the groups into a relationship of amity, and whose breeding power will compensate the group for the lives of its members previously destroyed. In time the actual exchange of girls becomes an exchange of wealth equivalent to one or more bride prices. <sup>(1)</sup> The functional value of the peace-making exchange is thereby diminished; but the payment continues as a mixture of punishment and compensation.

This system has definite biological advantages from the point of view of a society existing at a bare subsistence level. The feud, so long as weapons are of a primitive type, leads to the elimination of the less virile males without any serious damage to the family as a whole. At the same time rapid increase, which the country could not support, is prevented by the conditions of chronic desert warfare which puts a very severe strain on the women, who have to bear a large part of the economic burden.<sup>(2)</sup> Only the most vigorous of both sexes can hope to survive unaided in the seasonal bad years.

Somali society outside the few towns is of this type. Of the Somali as of the Arab it may be truly said that he is a parasite of the camel. Everything in his life is secondary to the welfare of his herds, for without their milk he starves, and lacking their possession he ceases to be a free man. His very name "Somali" is perhaps but a corrupted Arab nickname "Du-mali" — "owner of wealth," i.e., "stockowner"; but it represents a status of which he is extraordinarily proud.<sup>(3)</sup> The structure of his nomadic society is of a very ancient pattern; but it has been affected by two important factors; the introduction of Islamic law, and more recently the introduction of European administration with European law, currency and trading methods. The description which follows is based on discussions in the Isahak (Isaak) dialect. For convenience of use in the field these words are collected in the glossary. (See page 89).

We find that the sept (*jilib*, lit. "joint") is the fundamental social unit. This is a subdivision of the clan [*qolo* <sup>(4)</sup>] forming a part of the big patrilineal tribe (*tol*). This sept contains a small group of families (*rero*, lit. "enclosures" or "kraals") who combine to pay and receive blood compensation for acts by, or against their members. The word *hegal* has been used by

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<sup>(1)</sup> Numbers in the text refer to Notes (see p. 84 et seq.).

some authorities as being equivalent to the *rer*, i.e., the smallest unit of social extension. I find that it means "relative" and can be used loosely of any near blood relatives on either father's or mother's side. When the sept or *jilib* grows too large for convenient division of profits or responsibilities, a split takes place. The arrangement is confused by the fact that the word *rer* is often used loosely not only for "family," but also for "sept" and even sometimes for the equivalent of *tol*, e.g., the very large group of the *Rer Segulleh* which includes many hundred members. Nevertheless, there can be little doubt the *jilib* is the correct definitive name for the group that combines to pay blood money.

The *jilib* is controlled by the elders sitting in council. *Jilibs* are united by blood, and connected by marriage relationship: or sometimes by treaty alliance for mutual defence. They are normally divided by quarrels between the young men over the following subjects: women, water, grazing, and the concealment of lost stock. As a result of these quarrels fights start, which cause wounding, broken bones, or death. These in turn give rise to hatreds which develop into feuds, which are carried on by a succession of raids with raiding parties. It may be noted that feuds, or at least the general clan jealousies, which at first sight appear to be senseless, seem in the past to have had a real functional value. They made certain that the boundaries of the clan grazing areas were fairly strictly defined and so prevented poaching of grazing, which is causing the present economic ruin of the country by progressive over-grazing, erosion and consequent desiccation of the once fertile "well area," called the *Ogo*, between the mountains and the flat waterless *Haud*. After a quarrel, offers of a settlement, or demands for compensation are made by the use of an embassy, whose members are, if possible, "in-laws" of both sides,<sup>(5)</sup> or failing these, old men not closely-related to either party.

The exchange of peace terms is followed by a general peace meeting<sup>(6)</sup> of both clans concerned. Compensation for wounding commences with the payment of sheep called variously the *budegeyo* (tail-cutting), or the *shashaffo* (fat), as maintenance for the injured till they are fit enough to have their wounds assessed in value. The examination of the stock offered in payment is done by a locally appointed board of elders called a *bash*, *gudi* or *panch*.<sup>(7)</sup> Payment is divided within the clan according to two alternative principles:—

- (1) *Qoro-leh* (penis possessors) or *Qoro-tirris* (penis count) that is to say all males paying equally, old or young, rich and poor alike.<sup>(8)</sup>
- (2) *Qabno* (wealth in stock) each *jilib* or *rer* paying proportionately to its wealth.

However, the actual details of division differ in every big clan. Customary law is called in Somali *her* and in Arabic *adat* and it undergoes frequent alterations in detail as the result of the decisions of representative clan meetings from time to time (rather as a joint stock company can by consent of its members alter the methods of apportioning profits on its shares). In addition to the private *her* of each clan, there is a more general *her* recognised by usage between clans. It should be emphasised that used in the narrow sense *her* is merely customary assessment, it is not a general "law," i.e., it carries no compulsive force. *Her* can also be used in the sense of a "custom" as applied to habit, or act, commonly observed.

The agreement is that the taking of a man's life, or of his powers of propagation by castration, is worth full compensation of 100 camels. A woman's life is worth 50 camels. These are the flat rates for individuals of each sex irrespective of age, wealth or position. The normal arrangement is that the near relatives (i.e., the *rer* of the person concerned) have a one-third responsibility for his actions. When compensation passes they give or receive  $33\frac{1}{3}$  camels, as the case may be. If it is for a woman's death, the amount is 17 camels. This special close relative's share is called the *jiffo* and is divided according to the custom accepted by the particular *jilib*. The remaining two-third share which is divided or paid, by the outer ring of cousins is called the *gobane*. A *gudi* assessment is done after a fight by balancing the totals of lives and injuries inflicted, into terms of standard camels and their fractional divisions, which are taken in terms of standard sheep. A *sagali* is a standard male camel worth nine standard female sheep, each standard sheep being worth in theory three rupees. The assessment of the value of injuries is done according to the tariff laid down by the Sheriat law and is done not by the *gudi* of elders but by the Kadi the Moslem judge. His report becomes part of the general settlement.

Another convenient customary institution which is now absorbed into the British legal system of bail bond, is that of taking security (*dummin*) for the appearance of accused persons. This was part of the old apparatus of the tribal councils.

To this broad outline of the indigenous legal organization of society there are a number of minor incidents, which control the working of the exchange system, when there is inequality of status. A free camel-owning Somali loses status temporarily, if he has to rely on the protection of anyone but his own family, within his own clan grazing area. Internecine clan quarrels, regional droughts, and external marriages however, often lead to the movement of small family groups into the areas of some other clan. Here they dare not stay, unless they are under the protection of some member of the local group. The compulsive

phrase demanding protection is *magan ban ku ahai*, which may be compared with the ancient Arab phrase used for the same purpose in the high deserts of Arabia *ana dakhilak*.<sup>(10)</sup>

A man may become *magan*<sup>(11)</sup> to another as a result of poverty, or quarrels with his family. It is a voluntary act, which can cease at will. The protector of the *magan* has no special title as such, though the Arab traders used the word *aban*. This means really the owner of one or more individuals of the outcaste serf tribes, (Midgans, Tomals, and Yibbirs) who are known collectively as *Sab*, a caste name which distinguishes them from the Somali freemen *Aji*.<sup>(12)</sup> The Arab traders required an equivalent for the Arabian institution of *rafiq*, i.e., "companion and surety," for passing through the wild country of the interior, and they used the word *aban* as a translation, (which no doubt flattered the Somalis while doing no harm to the Arabs!). The *magan*, if he is a permanent resident, usually performs a variety of services for his protector, although, as a result of the stock he has received, he is often independent of him. It is considered avaricious, though in fact it is common practice, to ask for such a deposit to be returned if the *magan* leaves the area of his protector and reassumes his own liberty of movement. A permanent *magan* of this sort will pay a share of his protector's liabilities for the *mag* of his clan's killings. The temporary *magan* who demands only safety for the course of a journey, naturally is not involved in any of these stock arrangements, except that it is the duty of his protector to see that *mag* is actually paid by his clansmen, if they kill his *magan*. Sometimes such a protector may endeavour to claim this sum for himself, but he will usually find it impossible to maintain his claim against blood relatives of the deceased.

The same system applied to the payment of compensation by or to the *Sab* people. This was organized through the respective *abans* of either side, who levied payment on the relatives and paid a proportional share themselves. If there was no *aban* available, (for all *Sab* were theoretically subject to one or other *Aji*), the only action possible was by straightforward retaliation in which the injured party usually looted the offending *Sab*. The system of *aban* or protection is rapidly falling into abeyance as the *Sab* assert their independence and equality before the law. The Italians by recruiting *Sab* and *Aji* irrespective of status for their *Banda* troops also probably contributed a good deal to this change. Nevertheless, this change in status is much resented by the *Aji*, who are bitterly scornful of the *Sab* and only too ready to interpret any demand for menial labour from them as an attempt to lower them to the social level of the *Sab*.

In recent years, when the inequitable boundary arrangements were an encouragement to the elements of disorder to

cause the maximum nuisance, the habit of *falag* (from the Italian word *farago*) grew up, which was a distinguishing name of outlawry for a robber, who was even prepared to raid his own clansmen. Somali society had not yet developed a social mechanism for dealing with this menace, which they left to be kept in check by the European administration.

One feature of customary law has been omitted; the case for compensation as apology (*haal*) for wounded honour, as a result of any of the following acts: public insult by a slap in the face from one grown man to another, by a blow with a shoe, or a whip, rape, or illicit intercourse with an unaffianced virgin (*haal* to her father); marriage to a girl already affianced to another man, (*haal* to her fiancé); failure to marry the girl after the betrothal (*haal* to her father) uninvited entry to a man's house or uninvited conversation with a man's wife (*haal* to the husband). The normal rate of compensation for all these improprieties was a pony (value five camels), whose possession gave prestige to its owner. Later this sensible "functional" exchange degenerated into a mere cash payment.

The spread of Islam among these hamitic tribes<sup>(13)</sup> put an Islamic gloss upon the customary organization of the country, but never produced any effective change in the tribal customs relating to compensation. The *lex talionis* (Arabic *gisas*), which is the principle of the Sheriat law, was never introduced; for there was no supreme authority to enforce it, and so the looser and less brutal methods of pagan compensation continued. Only the Sheriat took over three spheres of law; marriage and divorce; the division of the inheritance of deceased persons together with the rules of mortmain; and thirdly, the assessment of wound compensation, usually described as a man's *haq*. On both of the latter topics a convenient list of rules and tariff of valuation for injuries already existed, which could easily be applied and thus save argument. It was to deal with these three sections of the law that the Kadi's Courts Ordinance No. 17/1937 was eventually passed, legally recognizing the power already exercised. It should be noted that *haq* means "justice," "truth," "right" both generally and in individual instances. It is the direct contrary of *dullum* and injustice, grievance, wrong.

As regards marriage, the Sheriat law produced singularly little effect; the three gifts, betrothal payment, bride price, and dowry continued, although the first two were forbidden by the Sheriat law. Only two innovations appeared, a recognised wedding present from husband to wife which became the wife's individual property, and the right of the woman to maintenance which was established.

Islam introduced a system of divorce which put the male sex at a considerable advantage; for only they could divorce.

They could, by the "single divorce" (*dalgat*) separate their wives from themselves without maintenance, and, by bringing a complaint of disobedience, gain from the Kadi an order of "judicial separation" known as *nakira* or Arabic *nashiza*, which usually ended in the wife becoming a prostitute to maintain herself. The female sex, however, developed their own equally effective indirect methods of maintaining their status and of the two they are to-day probably the dominant sex, since they are far more economically indispensable than the males. The Islamic divorce spell (*dalak*), however, acquired a position of peculiar indirect importance quite distinct from its direct function. It became used as a form of binding oath with economic sanctions: for, if a man was made to swear to the truth before his "in-laws," and confirm his oath by the triple divorce spell (*dar saddeh dallak*) his action was irrevocable. If afterwards the man was proved to have been lying, his marriage was destroyed by his own action and thus his bride-price was wasted. This oath was naturally more powerful than the oath on the Koran, which was only enforced by a vague religious sanction.

However, the Koranic spell was used by the Moslem *mullah* or *wadad* in two ways which had legal application. First, as an ordeal (*luqmata hajjar*—stone morsel) by making each of a row of suspects eat a morsel of bread, over which a conditional curse had been read, and thus revealing the guilty by his inability to swallow the bread which becomes like stone in his mouth. Secondly, as a conditional curse on an enemy or escaped thief whose naked foot-track is scraped up and taken to the *wadad* who reads the chapter of the Koran known as the *yassin* over the dust, which is believed to cause the spirit of the man to shrivel, so that he goes mad and dies. This curse is called *rad-qad*—"track-taking" and is still much used. It is noteworthy that this chapter (*sura*) of the Koran which is called the *yassin* is the one used to shrive the soul of a dying man as he gives up the ghost. Its use as a curse is, therefore, easily understood on normal lines of magic, as it is a blessing so to speak turned inside out.

Such was the situation when British influence began to extend into the interior at the beginning of the century. There is no need to dwell on the long intervening lapse before the exhausting, guerrilla war with Mohamed Abdulla Hassan was brought to a close with his death on 23rd November, 1920. The administration was then faced with a situation analogous to that of the Sudan Government after the battle of Omdurman. It was thought necessary to try and impose a limitation to the constant feud murders which racked the country, but the administration had been deeply impressed with the violent and fractious nature of the population, whose chiefs (*sultan*, *gerad* or *ugas*) had little control over them. No attempt was, there-

fore, made to build up society on a tribal basis; but certain elders of wealth and importance, who represented particular *jilibs*, were given Government recognition in each district as *akils*—"wisemen." They were employed first as arbitrators and finally by the Akils' Courts Ordinance of 25/5/21 established as members of district native courts with a minimum quorum of three and a full court of five members. The jurisdiction of such courts was limited by Proclamation of 12/3/1928 to a subject matter not exceeding Rs. 60-0-0 or four camels or 36 sheep. This jurisdiction was extended by Notice of 30/9/31 to ten camels and 50 sheep, but its nature as a purely civil court was not changed. The *akils* were limited entirely to civil powers though the subject matter which they dealt with often concerned matters of a nature regarded as criminal under British law. They were allowed "on receipt of written authority from a district court—

To enquire into and decide

- (a) any point of native law and custom.
- (b) any question relating to the value of *yarad* or *dibaad* paid or to be paid.\*
- (c) any matter affecting the value or amount of stock or property transferred, or paid over, or alleged to have been transferred, or paid over, on account of a tribal or other settlement.

Provided that nothing in this section shall be read to mean or to include any question of Mohammedan law or any question affecting the administration of Mohammedan law."

In other words the Akils Court was regarded with grave suspicion. It was not given the old powers of a tribal *shir*, but was restrained to settlements as a court of first instance to matters relating to minor wounds, insult and petty stock theft, and to acting as an advisory council to the District Court.

The place of the tribal council was taken by the District Court, whose directions were contained in the Principal Order-in-Council, 1929, Article 12.

"In all cases, civil and criminal, to which natives are parties, every court

- (a) shall be guided by native law, so far as it is applicable and is not repugnant to justice and morality, or inconsistent with any Order-in-Council or Ordinance, and
- (b) shall decide all such cases according to substantial justice, without excessive regard to technicalities of procedure or undue delay."

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\*See Glossary—Section "Marriage."



The wording of this Ordinance made possible a great mass of cases outside the range of British law, and which were hardly subjected to any form of legal scrutiny. In some district offices a record book of decisions, which defined various aspects of tribal custom, was kept, and thus some degree of uniformity within the district maintained on grounds of precedent. The District Commissioner for all practical purposes became a tribal *sultan* wielding arbitrary powers according to what he thought was a reasonable compromise between local ideas of customary right and his own European ideas of moral justice. His judgments in this sphere were given legal sanction and support by the Political Cases (Attachment of Livestock) Ordinance No. 3/1937. The situation differed considerably from that in districts in East Africa where under one or other of the various Native Authority Ordinances, the District Native Court has certain criminal powers, and is usually itself a court of appeal from various inferior courts, while a right of appeal exists from it to the District Commissioner and thence to the Provincial Commissioner, or to the High Court.<sup>(14)</sup>

In British Somaliland, the disadvantage of the system was that the entire machinery of administration became personal in nature, far too much direct work was thrown on the District Commissioner, who was thus forced to act as a court of first instance for all serious crime within his district. Moreover, as the machinery of the police force also largely depended on him, all investigation was under his direction. Either he was hopelessly overworked, or else far too few cases were taken up to impress the civil population with the existence of general legal sanctions. In an undisciplined and irritable society like the Somalis, the situation was very difficult. Owing to the unfortunate methods of colonial financing, it was impossible to get additional staff without upsetting the Colonial Office Budget balance. However, a grant-in-aid was eventually obtained from the War Office for the maintenance of an armed force, the Somaliland Camel Corps, as a part of Imperial defence, although there was no serious intention of ever using it outside the country.

Thus while there was established a military unit capable of undertaking large-scale operations, there was still no force under the direct control of the District Commissioners sufficiently mobile to maintain necessary contact with the tribesmen and strong enough to carry out day-to-day police work. For this reason small incidents which in the early stages could have been dealt with by a few police had to be allowed to grow until the gravity of the situation justified military action. This did not make for good administration.

It may be noted that for the time being the situation has been met as regards policing in British Somaliland by the

employment not only of an official police force but of a permanent district establishment of *illalos* (scouts) who are directly responsible to the District Commissioner, and in Somalia by the posting of a platoon of Gendarmerie to each District Headquarters, working under the direction of the Political Officer. These arrangements, however, have not brought the need for the Camel Corps to an end. Apart from the general security of war-time defence, the Ethiopian frontier will require armed protection for as far ahead as can at present be envisaged.

To return to the legal position in British Somaliland and the working of District Courts. At the same time as the "political" case was given grounds of legal recognition by the Principal Order-in-Council of 17/12/29, the Indian Penal Code and Indian Ordinances generally were brought into application by Article 16 "so far as circumstances permit." Thus the compromise position was reached that the District Officer investigated all reported cases of "killing." If after investigation, the crime appeared to be of a brutal nature it was, if possible, taken up criminally to be tried by the Protectorate Court.

Two difficulties lay in the way of the effective use of this coherent body of law as an instrument of social education. The first was that the Indian Penal Code, like the English law envisages an effective police machine. In fact, many of the rules exist to safeguard the accused from a perhaps not incorrupt and certainly powerful police force. In a country where the police force was still largely controlled by lines of clan loyalty rather than by an *esprit de corps*, it was difficult to work, the more so as the very great majority of constables and N.C.O.s were illiterate and had no ideas or instruction in police detection or prosecution. Secondly, there was the extreme difficulty arising from the fact that this desolate stretch of sand, scrub, and rock which forms Somaliland had become a pawn in European politics. The imposition of European "national" boundaries which cut across tribal grazing areas was at first regarded as a meaningless insult. Later, with the attempt to impose on either side the administration of European law, it was found a convenient sanctuary from justice for malefactors. "Over the border" acquired the same meaning as in our mediaeval and early modern history of Northern England.

District Commissioners were, therefore, reluctant to apply the sanctions of criminal law since the chance of their successful application was so extremely small. Blood called for blood, or compensation. If a case was taken up criminally, compensation ceased to be applicable; but the chances of the murder being revenged by the injured clan, if hanging was not effectively carried out on the criminal, were very high. It was, therefore, preferable for the District Commissioner, who was concerned principally to reduce the unrest in his district to a

minimum, to take as few cases as possible by normal methods of criminal prosecution, since with the means at his disposal he had little chance of bringing a prosecution to a successful conclusion.

The difficulties in his way were not merely those of escape from arrest. Collective punishment provided machinery for that; (if it was sufficiently clear that a man's group had aided his escape). The trouble lay deeper, for the feud organization and the control of the Moslem religious leaders (*wadads*) over a superstitious peasantry rendered the procedure of English law practically useless. The sanction of the oath on the Koran had been destroyed in the courts, or at least gravely weakened by these religious leaders who taught that—

- (1) there was no religious penalty for a false oath, even on the Koran, if made before an infidel.
- (2) a false oath made to save a man's life carried no penalty.

A third point of no little importance in decreasing the prestige of the Koranic oath has been the difference between British and Islamic legal procedure. In a Moslem Court all evidence is given unsworn until the judge is convinced of the correctness of the case of one or other party. Once he has made up his mind he presents the successful party with the Koran and asks him to swear to the truth of his statement. This closes the case and everyone is impressed with the strength and divine character of the oath. In British law, all parties are sworn, even in quite trivial cases and the fiction is maintained that all evidence given on oath is true. As such evidence constantly and repeatedly conflicts, and no divine intervention blasts the liars, the religious sanction of the oath has consequently deteriorated.

For these reasons a prosecution by the State for a murder committed by one clan against another, was (and is) regarded merely as a clan fight reduced to legal terms of organized perjury. A man could and still can, call for evidence from his clansmen who will freely and automatically perjure themselves in his behalf. The answer to the great majority of criminal prosecutions of all kinds is a manufactured alibi supported by as many witnesses as the accused or his *Akil* are prepared to fee to leave their normal occupations on the pastures and come in to court. No appeal, however ridiculous, is to be neglected, and grave injustice is often done, as criminals escape to vaunt their prowess after wasting large sums of public money on their maintenance and that of their witnesses, and even on the provision of additional skilled legal defence to aid them to escape the punishment they deserve. Public contempt of the law, therefore increased, as did proportionately the ramifications of clan revenge.

Moreover, since the powers of the tribal chiefs (*sultans*) had been absorbed by the District Commissioner, (who was necessarily but an infrequent visitor in the clan grazing area) the countryside lacked executive leaders; for, without power to maintain it, the name of *Sultan* was but a mockery. The Court *Akils*, into whose hands Government had bestowed a modicum of power, held this only when in association with the District Officer during their three months' period of service at headquarters during the year. In general, they lacked sufficient personal prestige and were too badly paid to resist the temptation of their short term of power. Their courts became a by-word of corruption and bribery, so that litigants always tried to avoid them by going direct to a district officer. Since their work was done at the district headquarters they acquired permanent houses there and so often became divorced from the clan groups they were supposed to represent. Instead, they form a reactionary townee group of ignorant, factious, professional litigants, whose vested interests, combined with that of the *wadads*, form the greatest obstacle to progress of all kinds, while their extravagant fees are the chief impediment to any equitable settlement of minor cases. The average plaintiff prefers to accept minor compensation, or inflict direct retaliation rather than fall into the jaws of these insatiable sharks. Sidney Smith remarked, "Where judges are unjust, the nation falls: for then the multitude has nothing to defend." Such is the present condition.

The country is faced by a number of vital problems in which economic and political factors are deeply intermingled. First, it might be said, is the need to establish a controlled grazing system by which the progressive desiccation will be checked. But it is impossible to enforce such a policy without more effective political control than is at present maintained over the small nomadic groups. The closing of areas to prevent them being grazed for a period (and thus allow their recovery) demands constant patrolling and a larger force of police and veterinary scouts than could be supported on the pre-war budget. The desiccation of the Ogo well area and of the Nogal Valley is, however, of wider significance than to British Somaliland alone. It is a compulsive force which must in the long run either drive the Somalis southward, setting up a series of migrational waves which will flow over Galla-Sidamo or into Kenya, or else compel them to leave their country altogether by sea to work as sailors, soldiers, cattle-traders or dragomen in East Africa or the Mid-East. It can thus be seen that the problem of social stabilization of the nomad in Somaliland is one of very great exterior political importance.

It may be noted that the same problem has arisen in Arabia and that H.M. King Ibn Saud has made use of the *Ikwan*

organization of the Wahabi sect as a form of irregular religious and political police to tie down various Arab clans to the particular wells to which they lay claim, and to organize there some degree of irrigation agriculture in the surrounding oasis.

For this purpose some degree of compulsion and direction is necessary. Doughty has described the extraordinary difficulty in getting the Semites to combine on any voluntary enterprise of common benefit (for example, the repair of the great well at Kheybar). The Wahabi zealots under the direction of their enlightened king seem to be providing the necessary stimulus. It is probable that a similar attempt was made in Somaliland at the time of the Mohammedan invasion of Ethiopia early in the seventeenth century A.D. It has been suggested that<sup>(15)</sup> the ruined villages (of which traces are found in many places from the Harar-Borama region right across Somaliland to the Nogal) are but trading towns, which existed to handle the loot from the sack of Ethiopia, and naturally faded when their economic basis disappeared. This may well be so; but I would put forward as a suggestion, from the position of these ruins on cultivable land and the fact that on most sites the mosque is the most prominent ruin, that many of these "villages" must have been institutional settlements by one or other of the great *tariqas*,<sup>(16)</sup> where religious instruction was given and organized agricultural work carried out (probably by slaves and women) at the same time.

This method is hardly available to the British Government on a broad scale, though in modified form it is still continued in the case of one or two *sheikhs*, who combine religious sanctity with personal prestige (e.g., the happy and prosperous settlement of Sheikh Ahmed Sheikh Musa at Hahe). It would be impossible for an "infidel" Government to organize with compulsion a series of Islamic religious-cum-agricultural settlements, though these might well be encouraged if there were suitable religious leaders capable of their management. This might be done by negotiation through the leaders of the great *tariqas* in Mecca, if the scheme met with the approval of the Saudi King (which it might well, as it falls into line with his own internal policy). Nevertheless, it must be remembered that most Somalis are bigoted *sunnis*, and regard with grave alarm the reforming iconoclasm of the Wahabis in the sacred cities. The choice of personnel would thus be a somewhat delicate matter of internal Islamic church politics; but if successful, it would be well worth the effort.

Whether or not a religious framework is employed for developing irrigation agriculture, there is little doubt that this is the only hopeful method of making these vast barren areas profitable and able to carry more people at a high level of civilization. At present the violent spates which fill the Tug

Der (the watercourse that drains all central British Somaliland into the Nogal Valley) flood the steppes below Ber and then evaporate wastefully. A proportion of the water presumably reaches underground streams to fill the Nogal wells. A dam above Burao coupled with proper forestry control would give a controlled supply which would soon make British Somaliland self-supporting in sorghum and maize. Such a scheme would require the introduction of a number of peasants skilled in irrigation agriculture, for the nomad is not so easily to be wooed to a life of toil. The same applies to similar schemes for operation on the upper reaches of the Fafan Shebelli Juba and Tana rivers. It is this need for an agricultural population that has turned some peoples' eyes towards India with the idea of settling in these areas the overflow of Moslem peasants from the Punjab. Such a scheme is full of possibilities but also fraught with great dangers.

The control of the nomads must begin with the proper demarcation of their clan grazing areas and watering rights. On this fundamental basis it is possible to allocate strategically a number of centres where matters of judicial and tribal importance can be discussed at regular intervals.<sup>(17)</sup> Thus it may be possible to keep the nomads away from the evil influence of such towns as Burao and under the direct control of their own natural leaders. Once this is established, which may take five to ten years, it may be possible to institute what is a fundamental factor in any properly organized Government, that is to say direct taxation. The present method of taxation by excise, market dues and transit dues, certainly collects some revenue, but leaves the ordinary man entirely out of relation with his Government. Proportional clan tribute (*Zakat*) on a stock assessment, is a fair and recognized method of raising revenue, which is found in all Islamic countries—throughout Arabia and in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, where the stock assessment is done by the clan and roughly checked by the District Commissioner. The trouble in Somaliland is that this direct tribute (called *Ziko*) is drained improperly into the pockets of the leaders of the *tariqas*. It is said that a proportion of this money is forwarded to Mecca to maintain the *tariqa* buildings there, but no accounts are kept. (The payment is similar in type to the payments of Annates, Peter's pence, etc., which were collected from all over mediaeval Europe to maintain the Papal Court in Rome.) Certainly, in Mecca, as in Rome, pilgrims benefit from the existence of these great institutional hostels; but the cost is out of proportion to the gain in services to the inhabitants of a very poor country. Moreover, it is a fundamental question of principle, for who collects the *Ziko* or *Zakat* is the ruler of the country and it is clear that the religious leaders still hold this position in their own estimation. As a

result they are exceedingly nervous of any threat to their interests and it is probable that any attempt to collect direct taxation in the form of a proportional stock levy would be met by armed resistance organized by the *wadads*. It would be dangerous and useless from the financial point of view, to attempt any such policy until the tribal leaders have learnt once more to organize their people into coherent groups from whom they can exact some degree of obedience.

It is arguable that the tendency developed under the present Political Cases (Attachment of Livestock) Ordinance, 1937, is not the best method of achieving this, since it necessarily concentrates all authority in the hands of the District Commissioner. Devolution of authority would appear to be the wisest policy as has been proved in East Africa and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. It is suggested that in Somaliland as elsewhere the same man should gradually be trained to combine the offices of tax collector and judge; to occupy the position of "chief" in a given area, even if he is assisted in his work by clerks for the first, and elders for the second set of duties. This involves the disappearance gradually of a large number of inefficient, badly-paid *akils*, and their replacement by a much smaller number of well-paid *sultans* with a trained staff.

The control of finance is ultimately the deciding factor in any society. Where there is a stream of trade it is usually possible for the local small chief to set up sufficient resistance to make a portion of it flow into his own pockets. Immediately his wealth and consequent power increases out of all proportion to that of his followers. He can buy new and better weapons and additional horses for raiding, and employ personal attendants, or slaves. Where no such stream of trade exists, the tribal chief tends to be but first among equals, an elder to whom respect is due on account of his birth and personality, but who cannot exact obedience by force, or purchase homage by lavish hospitality. Thus the Sultan or *Gerad* of the Warsengeli is perhaps the most powerful Somali tribal chief within his tribe; for his influence is strong in the *dhow* traffic from Las Khereh and Elayu to Aden, and in the organization of the frankincense trade. Similarly, the Sultan of Obbia in Mudugh grew powerful on the profits from the monsoon *dhow* traffic from Makalla and the Persian Gulf and the consequent trade into the interior. The chiefs of the nomad tribes of the hinterland rarely acquired much position of control; for example, the Habr Toljaala have no Sultan, the Ogaden are split up among many small rival chiefs, and the position of the Habr Yunis Chieftainship, which was once of some importance because of the trade of Burao, faded away during the wars with the Mullah, followed by the British control of the entrepot trade there.<sup>(18)</sup> The *Gerad* of the Dulbahanta, based on Las Anod, was able to extract some

small profit from the occasional caravans in the Nogal Valley coming up from Eil, and so maintained himself in a slightly superior position to his followers. The same applies to the Sultan of the Habr Awal whose people grazed around the caravan routes from Zeila, Bulhar, and Berbera to the interior.

The Sultan or *Ugas* of Gadabursi was at first in a distinct and advantageous position, for not only did the caravan route to Harar run through part of his area, but his people are partly cultivators and so far easier to control and tax. Yet for this very reason, after the 1897 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, the *Ugas*, a far-sighted man named Nur Robleh, did everything in his power to prevent his people cultivating, for he realised that it would bring them under the control of the Amharic authority established at Harar ever since retirement of the Egyptian Garrison from there in 1884. However, circumstances were too strong for him to resist, and during his lifetime he agreed to pay a nominal tribute of bulls every year for his tribe's right to graze on its own territory now under Ethiopian control. His son, Robleh Nur, went further and accepted an Ethiopian stipend and collected taxes for Ethiopia from his tribesmen with the help of an armed guard. This led to such trouble that he was by general acclamation ejected from the chieftainship. From this started a feud which split the Gadabursi tribe in two parties and this unhappiness has persisted up to the present day.

It can thus be seen that the problems of Somaliland consist of a whole series of interlocking factors which cannot be treated separately. The unrest which causes embarrassment to any central government authority apart from being a normal feature of nomadic life, derives directly from two distinct sets of causes, one biological and economic, the other political and administrative.

The grazing problem cannot be finally settled by improved grazing methods alone. Even if reserves, watering areas, rotation of grazing are all organized on the most enlightened and intelligent plan, the natural increase of stock will eventually advance beyond the capacity of the land to carry it, the tribesmen will tend to expand their grazing areas and so a political problem will arise. Formerly tribal wars and periodic droughts caused sufficient deaths to limit this expansion, so that there was a balance maintained between the vegetational cover of the soil and the animal life depending on it. Artificial peace imposed from above destroys this balance, and the only means to regain it can be by some artificial removal or destruction of the surplus stock. The most natural and profitable method of doing this is by stock markets, worked if possible in conjunction with some scheme for the export of meat, either canned, frozen or on the hoof. The standardized grading of hides and the utilization of by-products for manure are natural corollaries.



Stock markets by themselves are ineffective; for, unless there is pressure to sell, the herdsmen, who are practically self-supporting, will only sell a small proportion of their surplus, quite insufficient to relieve the pressure on the land. The natural means to create this pressure to sell is by a stock tax an institution which is found in many parts of Africa where Moslem nomads are in the majority. It is usual to leave the collection to the native authority, while the European officer supervises, hears complaints and requests for exemption. Lord Hailey in his *African Survey* (pp. 577-9, 589) describes the Jangali Tax in Northern Nigeria which is levied at a rate of Sh. 1/- or Shs. 1/6 per head of stock by the tribal headmen on the wandering Fulani cattlemen. This tax is assessed and collected when the cattle-owners return with their herds to the districts in which they are deemed to be resident. The same type of tax, known as "pacage," is levied in Senegal, Mauretania, the Niger, and French Sudan. Such taxes are much more easily organized where there is an effective tribal authority. It would be difficult at first in Somaliland with the minute social unit of the *jilib*. It is obvious that some deliberate administrative change is required which will develop increased wealth in the country and canalize revenue so that a comparatively small number of individuals in each area can be made responsible for tax collection. The institution of tribal chieftainship is the natural one to revive for this purpose.

Such a policy is perhaps more dangerous here than elsewhere; for there is no doubt that the Somali's leading characteristics—bred of his bitter struggle for existence—are jealousy and avarice. Thus there is always the danger of a man's neighbours combining to destroy him since he has received the recognition of government, and, contrariwise, of that man using his position to further the interests of his clan, or to divert revenue to his own ends. But these risks must always be taken in the early stages of developing a native administration, and there is no reason to suppose that the nature of the Somali is such, that he will not eventually respond to the same processes which have been applied successfully on Semites to the North of him and on Bantu to the South.

Thus it will be seen that the fundamental need is to re-educate Somali public opinion so that the sanctions of behaviour are not merely those that govern a minute self-sufficient group of nomads; but of a wide community. This process of re-education must begin from the top, to produce a very small intelligentsia of chiefs, clerks, dressers, and veterinary assistants who can manage efficiently the apparatus of Government, without confusion or corruption, and who are in spirit "Government men."

Their education is best done outside the country beyond the pernicious influence of the *wadads*. That is why the government sends all the boys it can afford to Gordon College at Khartoum. Once these new men are sufficiently numerous to control the machinery of local politics, the reforms which are so urgently needed can be carried through effectively.

I append for consideration a letter of comment written by my uncle C. A. Willis, C.B.E., late of the Sudan Civil Service, describing the gradual introduction of a policy of taxation on the lines suggested here in the early days of the Sudan Administration after the fall of Khalifate and before World War No. 1.

#### NOTES AS TO METHODS EMPLOYED IN EARLY ADMINISTRATION IN KORDOFAN.

By C. ARMINE WILLIS

(late Lieut.-Governor, White Nile Province, Anglo-Egyptian Sudan.)

I was much interested in your comparison of Somaliland with Kordofan. I daresay the conditions when I first went to Kordofan were fairly parallel as famine was either prevalent or so near that one hardly noticed the difference and general poverty was appalling. But the province recovered rapidly owing to the Gum trade, which introduced money from outside, whilst Government and other demands for camels, horses and cattle went a long way to enable the nomad tribes to meet their liabilities.

Taxation was a difficult problem and the Sudan Government met it largely by trial and error. There were two main methods—tribute which was assessed tribally, and grain and herd taxes which were supposed to represent the Moslem tax of 10% and were assessed by local boards and imposed individually on the produce. There was also a tax on irrigated land, which I think we may neglect in the immediate circumstances but it was run on the same lines of a 10% charge on produceable value.

Tribute under the Turkish Government was assessed tribally, e.g., the Kabbabish were assessed at £E.1,000, but the Government to avoid trouble farmed out the collection of this sum to professionals who sent out armed bodies to collect what they could, and the tax farmers would probably get £3,000 and the armed parties would collect their bit on the side and what the tribe actually paid was probably over £5,000 and possibly nearer £10,000, as the tribal sheikhs and headmen still expected to get their bit.

To avoid this, it was arranged that the head of the tribe should pay in his money himself to the Governor of the Province under Sudan Government Rules. Actually the Kabbabish were an interesting example, because Ali Wad el Tom when he was Nazir made no secret of the fact that what he collected off the people was considerably more than the £1,000 assessed—he admitted to J. D. Craig, who was District Commissioner, up there, that he was not doing all this for his health, and he collected I imagine about £2,000 over the tribute (which he took mostly in kind, camels which he put into his own herd), to enable himself to run his own show, entertain the tribesmen and keep up his position. This system inevitably led to grave abuses—a Nazir could apportion the tribute more or less as he pleased and he naturally put it on heavy to his enemies and lightly to his friends. So much so, that steps had to be taken amongst the Hamar and the Baggara (here I

speak from my own experience) to allot the exact proportion of the tribute due from each section of the tribe. This gradually developed to such a pitch that the tribute was practically assessed by families, and after a short time we were able to introduce the normal herd and grain tax.

When I first went to Kordofan I was put on to supervising the assessment of herd tax and it did not take me long to discover that the "board" was completely corrupt. Two lists were made, one more or less truthful which was used by the Sheikhs to collect what they thought they could get, and another to put in to Government which was put at such a figure as the Government would accept without too much misgiving. Of course, as people became more literate and more capable of approaching Government on their own they began to demand receipts for what they paid and expect them to be accurate, and though the system can never be really accurate, it works well enough when there is sufficient publicity and knowledge of what are Government dues and what are not.

It is not to be expected that Sheikhs and Nazirs will work without recompense and what the Government gave them as commission for tax collecting was quite inadequate. There were, too, various customary payments to the Sheikhs, which had no official stamp, but it was conveniently desirable that the Sheikh should get, as an honorarium for his trouble and as a hold over his people. An example of this was *Fitr*, which is technically a payment to the local Moslem religious leader as a sort of charity like Easter Sunday collection—I remember Slatin being absolutely outraged when he found the Hamar and Baggara Sheikhs collecting it for themselves. But he had to give way because it had become a tradition and they were going to get something out of their people. There is not much altruism or public spirit about an Arab—and in a state of poverty it is not to be expected. The boards, who assessed the herds and crops, were appointed so that in theory no village assessed itself but only its neighbours—and a clerk was supplied or paid by Government to record the findings. In theory, they went to each holding and saw the herd and/or the crop and assessed accordingly, but you can imagine that that entailed a lot of bother and early rising so a statement "on oath" took its place, which was practically valueless.

To go back to the introduction of tribute—what the Government did was to assess, say, the Kabbabish at £1,000—the Governor of Kordofan (or District Commissioner) then saw the Nazir and said you will have to produce 200 camels assessed at £10 each. The Nazir naturally sent in all the worst he could and even if they actually numbered 200, they probably could not be realized at the assessed value. The Government took over what it could use at a valuation and sent the rest to the local market and credited the result as tribute paid by the Kabbabish. If there was a discrepancy, it was adjusted through the Finance Department, e.g., animals taken over by Government could be valued at any figure the Government liked so that the resultant figure might be anything. It was all right in British hands but open to a lot of juggling, and as often as not the people who brought in the tribute animals would swop half of them for worse beasts *en route* and pocket the difference. Slatin's attitude at that time was that it did not much matter so long as the appropriate gesture was made. The tribe could hardly be blamed if the market in camels or cattle was bad and prices did not realize what had been expected when the assessment was made. The fact was that the necessity of collecting Government tribute and enforcing that on his people did give the head of the tribe some authority and did introduce a bit of discipline where there had been very little.

People commonly attribute powers to a native chief that he could never have and would not know how to use. Ali Wad el Tom who was

very famous as a "strong" Nazir of the Kabbabish, as a matter of fact had to consult at least five "Jekies" (local religious lights) before he could put anything over the tribe.

Even if there are not tribal chiefs, there are always individuals who take the lead in the various tribal activities, e.g., somebody considers it time to go to such and such a grazing ground and everybody accepts it more or less, because they cannot afford to get away from the mutual protection provided by the community. How far such men can be roped in to help Government to make some sort of discipline in the tribe or section depends enormously on your administrative staff, their power of selection, persuasion and sometimes compulsion.

I see I have not answered all your questions.

Assessment in the case of nomad tribes was more or less blind—until some data could be obtained. There was no compulsory system of branding because all tribes used their own brands without compulsion and had to for security's sake. The recovery of an unbranded camel that had been stolen was pretty hopeless. Assistance was mainly passive, i.e., they just didn't pay and the Nazir, or who ever it might be, simply said "so and so" will not pay, and small punitive forces used to go and collect by force as many animals as were required. This led to the grossest injustice, since, as often as not, the people whose herds were raided had already paid their share; and one of the jobs I had to do was to sort out the Baggara tribute and find out who had paid what, and it was a ghastly job. Later on when I had been through the tribes and knew the country I was able to disconcert them by arriving at their watering places unexpectedly and wanting to know things, but it was a very tiresome job and very hard work. But roughly there was at least one local expedition every year against some recalcitrants up to 1909. After that MacMichael amongst Kabbabish and I with Hamar and the Baggara managed without military assistance. But it could only have been done by chasing the tails of the recalcitrants before. It could have been done better and more equitably if the soldiers had known more about the administrative problem, but you can't get everything.

In the first year or so the Governor or his deputy went through the troublesome tribes with a bigish escort and collected tribute as he went along. Then if there were runaways, and it was practicable, they were pursued and their animals taken plus a fine. In practice this did not often occur, because the native ran too fast and too far. But the idea of a Government, and the necessity of paying it to go away, took very little time to absorb.

The answer to the question which is thus implicitly presented—"Why if this was done in the Sudan, has the same policy not been applied in Somaliland?"—is a simple one—"It is the frontier." But a discussion of the frontier takes one into a little known corner of diplomatic history. The territory of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan owes its present happy and peaceful condition to the condominium established there following Kitchener's campaign in the Sudan which brought to an end the Khalifate at the battle of Omdurman. The same series of events were ultimately responsible for the unfortunate conditions obtaining for several decades in the Somali areas. Lord Salisbury was deeply concerned with the importance of the Sudan campaign and the French advance towards the Nile Valley which led shortly afterwards to the "Fashoda incident." The Emperor Menelik at that time was successfully pursuing a vigorous

"forward" policy. The British required his assistance for the holding of the frontier in the Kassala area. Also it was hoped to prevent him co-operating with the French and allowing them to spread their sphere of influence from Djibouti westwards across Africa. The British Government were, therefore, not prepared to take a strong line with the Emperor as regards claims made for extension of Ethiopian influence in the Somali area. Looked at from a common sense point of view it is difficult not to sympathize with Lord Salisbury's attitude. The relevant importance of the Nile Valley, as compared with Horn of Africa was and is incontestable. Nevertheless, it is clear that the interests of the people on the spot were sacrificed for the benefit of other interests with which they were not even remotely concerned.

On the evacuation of Harar in 1884, by the Egyptian Government, the town was occupied by Ras Makonnen, Menelik's lieutenant and father of the present Emperor. It was Ras Makonnen who, in 1899, carried out the negotiations for the Emperor Menelik with Mr. Rennell Rodd, the British representative. Thus, although treaties of protection had been signed as far back as 1884, with the Esa and Gadabursi tribes, and subsequently with other British protected tribes, and even with the Ogaden in 1896; the whole of the Ogaden, very large parts of the Haud grazing areas (belonging to such tribes as the Habr Yunis, Aidegalleh, Habr Toljaala), the better half of the Gadabursi area and the greater half of the Esa country were signed away. This treaty represented a compromise to Ras Makonnen's claim for Ethiopian suzerainty extending right down to the sea-coast. It caused no disturbance at the time among any of the Somali people in the areas referred to, as they were entirely ignorant of the treaty, or its implications. It was only later as the clauses and boundaries began to be implemented that trouble started.

To-day as the result of General Cunningham's successful campaign in 1941, British administration extends from Eritrea to the Kenya borders. Except for the north-western marches of the Somalilands, where religious antagonism between Moslem and Copt provides a chronic danger to the peace, the question of tribal feuds becomes increasingly a matter of routine police control. Disarmament proceeds steadily and trade, once more on camel-back, is beginning to flow again along the old routes. Nevertheless, it must be remembered that present arrangements are but a temporary war-time solution. There is no certainty of a greater Somaliland until its establishment is ratified by the peace treaties. Although the Somalis are a potentially formidable community, they have few if any representatives capable of maintaining their interests in European circles, and for this reason they are likely to be overlooked in the council chamber.

But on the ground where they live, they cannot be, and any settlement which ignores their future as a single linguistic and racial group is certain to lack permanence.

Twice over in modern history the Somalilands have produced leaders capable of uniting the nomad groups by the stimulus of religion into an army that could wage war with considerable measure of success against contemporary Europeans. The first occasion was in the third decade of the sixteenth century when Ahmed bin Ibrahim al Ghazi, commonly known as "Mohammed Gran" (the left handed) led the Somalis of the kingdom of Zeyla (i.e., British Somaliland, including the Harar area) against the Ethiopians and Portuguese and defeated both until he was killed unexpectedly having relaxed his vigilance. The second occasion was during the present century when for two decades Mohammed bin Abdullah Hassan, the "Mad Mullah" maintained a guerrilla war against the British Government in spite of very great inferiority of arms and supplies. It is foolish for governments to pretend that the Somali likes one much better than another. British, Italians, French, and Ethiopians are all infidels with little but their money to recommend them. Indeed in spite of their long tradition of warfare and hatred for Ethiopia, the Somali might even vote, if given the opportunity, for Ethiopian rule throughout the Horn of Africa, as suggested by the irrepressible Miss Pankhurst. If he did so, he would vote for it, for the simple and beautiful reason that it would be no government at all, since no Ethiopian would dare to administer him. Life, therefore, would be the condition which the nomad prefers best—until he is the aggrieved party—simple anarchy and good grazing.

Such a policy of deliberate rejection of responsibility is not inconceivable. It has already been tried by the British Government in Somaliland, as indeed at various times in many other parts of the world. In 1909, Lord Crewe's despatch directed the cessation of administration in the interior and the retirement of Government to the coastal towns, which were of importance solely on grounds of naval strategy. The resultant period of anarchy, or "special acclimatization" as it might be called, of the population to the land and primeval conditions in which they lived, is still remembered with horror by the old men as the days of "Haram Oneh," when even a good Moslem ate filth, and nearly a third of the population died of internecine warfare and starvation. Richard Corfield's gallant fight at Dul Madoba in 1913, aroused political opinion in England to the position, and within two years the policy had changed to one which led eventually to the destruction of the Mullah's power and the partial pacification of the inland tribes. The chance of permanent stabilization presents itself at the end of this war in a form which is not likely to reoccur for a generation at least.

But if the ecological and racial questions that obtrude themselves so fiercely in this vast area of North-East Africa are ever to be settled, it will require not only a broad imagination to envisage them, but determination and tact to obtain concessions from all parties to get the needs of the local population recognized, where they conflict with larger vested interests. Finally, it will require a stable unified administration of resolute character maintained over a period of years with the expenditure of a good deal of external capital on education, land improvement, and the development of a few local produce factories for export of the existing dairy and sheep products. Once this is done the Somalilands may become a useful asset in a world economy rather than a chronic liability to all who are concerned with them.

The intention of this paper has been to stimulate thought in a general way on a difficult and little-known series of problems. It is not its function to bring forward detailed suggestions as to the future, which must carry external, political implications and, for this reason, in present circumstances be ill-timed. The reader is asked to ponder his map, where the rivers, the mountains, and the vast plains will give him the clearest indication of how the country should be run.

#### NOTES.

- (<sup>1</sup>) The more primitive condition is still the rule among the poorer tribes in Somaliland such as the Mijertein. The cash exchange is typical of the wealthier such as the various Isahak groups.
- (<sup>2</sup>) The women not only play their part in herding the stock and watering but manufacture the plaited mats of which the nomad tents are made, and also make most of the utensils in ordinary use for watering and milking, which are water-tight baskets. They also erect and pack the tents when the family moves. The men's chief work is the summer grazing of camels far out on the Haud and the exhausting winter water-drawing from the wells in the Ogo. The various types of mat are *kibit*—fluffy, dark-brown, of chewed bark, used in caravan for packing under the load next the camel's back: sometimes spoken of generally as herio-padding; *alol*—the stiff mat with withies interwoven, for the tent sides; *dermo-dior derin-ti* mats of palm-tree fibre; *aus* lit. "straw"—the ordinary all-purpose mat with grass ends on one side and a plaited pattern on the other. Varieties of better quality mat with decorative patterns in which coloured rags, silk and wool are used are *hohog*—first quality, *iskujoog*—second quality, and *gogos*—third quality. On the completion of any big mat a woman calls all her friends to a sort of "sewing bee" called *aus la tidayo*—"the plaiting of the straw" at which they sing while the men sit round and listen and a good deal of covert flirting is done.
- (<sup>3</sup>) Another alternative derivation given by Drake-Brockman in his book *British Somaliland* is from *So!*—"go!" *Mal!*—"milk"—the habitual courteous order of nomad host to his son or servant, when a visitor arrives. This is a picturesque suggestion but I believe unlikely. Most nicknames are abusive, and the Ethiopic "*Soumahe*"—"Heathens" given after the campaigns of Mohamed Gran is, I believe, the most probable origin of the name "*Somali*." This explanation will not be found popular among the Somalis themselves where the first or second derivation is preferred.

- (4) The normal word of importance in greeting a stranger is *qolo*. Thus the almost invariable question is "*Qolo matahai?*"—What is your clan?" The *tol* is of too wide extension to be of daily interest. It is often used on the same level of social extension as *assal*—confederacy. Thus, e.g., the Ogaden may be considered at the time as a single stem (*tol*) and also as a group or confederacy (*assal*) of independent clans. Some people prefer to spell *qolo*—"gholo." Paulitschke in his *Die Ethnographie des Nord Ost Afrikas* spelt it "*Kola*."
- (5) The ramifications of in-law relationships are most important. A man tends to get his wife from among the females of his mother's family, and this custom naturally reinforces the original marriage bond between the clans. When considering a marriage a man naturally takes into account the benefits he is likely to gain in grazing and watering rights from his "in-laws." In any consideration of clan grazing areas this system of insurance, by which a man can eke out existence in times of drought and trouble with the help of his in-laws, must be taken into account.
- (6) In British Somaliland, the word *wa'ad* is used, further south *musalaha* tends to be commoner; both are Arabic in origin.
- (7) There is a distinction between the modern *panch* and the old *gudi* (which is a logical incident of the Hamitic dual organization of society) since the *gudi* numbered four members, two from each side. The English introduction of a fifth member, who was agreed upon by both parties as an impartial arbitrator, was a real contribution to the settlement of disputes, since with five there was always bound to be a majority on one side or the other. This committee of five was called a *panch*, as a shortened form of the Hindustani word "*panchayat*"—a village council of five members. This derived naturally from the experience of officers in Indian administration since British Somaliland was, until 1898, under the India Office.
- (8) I believe this "sexual" phraseology to be a relic of a not very distant period when the half-pagan Somalis practised sex mutilation as a matter of ritual custom as is still found among many of the Galla and Danakil tribes to-day. Stone phallic monuments are found from the area of Borama (see A. T. Curle "*Carved Stones*" *Antiquity*, September, 1937), to Borana and Kaffa north of Lake Rudolf. Mutilation of a defeated enemy rendered his avenging spirit powerless. The conqueror after purification wears the *qallaco* a phallic symbol on his forehead as the gage of victory and reinforced strength. See Bieber *Das Kaffa*, Vienna, and Plowman "*Gedamoch Ceremonies*," *J.R.A.I.* (?1913).
- (9) The contrast between Islamic law (*sharia*) and local customary law (*adat*—*ga'ash* or *dastur*) is found all over the Islamic world.
- (10) Doughty, in the glossary of *Arabia Deserta*, gives "*Ana dakhilak*"—"I become thy dakhil"; "*el dakhil*"—lit. "one who enters to another," i.e., being come as it were under his roof he requires protection. Similarly in Somali "*Magan ban kuahai*"—"I become thy *magan*," i.e., "one under protection."
- (11) The word among the Southern Darod and in Northern Frontier District of Kenya is, I understand, "*shegat*" (Arabic).
- (12) Does not this "*Aji*" link up with the "*Ji*" root meaning "the people" of the nilotic and hamito-nilotic tribes, e.g., of the "*Ajiye*" of Labwor Hills in Uganda, and of Mount Kathianguore in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan? A few pronouns and numerals appear to be common to the *Ji* dialects and to Somali. Temperamentally, the nilote resembles the pastoral hamite more than the agricultural Bantu. While *Aji* in British Somaliland means people of stock-owner class, i.e., free Somali, in the Northern Frontier District of Kenya and in Borana Province of Ethiopia, it is used more vaguely to mean people of Somali extraction as opposed to negroes (Shankalla) or Amhara. It



is usually pronounced "Eji" in these southern regions. The step from this to "Ajiye" is insignificant, and my opinion is that in this area where the Sudanian-speaking negro tribes bordered on the Kushitic-speaking tribes and mixture took place, any who could claim to hamitic origin, did so. This may be a false etymological hypothesis, but it accords with the tradition of many of these border tribes as to their origin. The Rendille at the moment are an example in point of people in a transitional stage between the Somali and Nilotic type of culture.

As regards the outcaste Sab tribes. Their origin has been discussed by E. Cerulli in an article "L'Origine delle basse caste della Somalia" in *L'esplorazione Commerciale*, October, 1916, and in a very general discussion of the outcaste tribes of Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa contained as an appendix to his *Folk Literature of the Galla of Southern Abyssinia* reprinted by E. A. Hooton & Co. from *Harvard African Studies*, Vol. 111. He refers to R. Biasutti's article in the *Bulletin Soc. Geogr. Italiana*, Roma, 1905, Vol. 6, p. 175, which was the first attempt to make some broad generalizations as to these hunting tribes spread all over East Africa as far south as Tanganyika.

It does not appear, however, to have been noticed that exactly the same cultural distinctions of caste obtain in Arabia between the Arab and the outcaste tribes there as between the Somali and the Sab. I quote Doughty, *Arabia Deserta*, Vol. I, p. 324. "These alien and outcaste kindreds are of fairer looks than the hunger-bitten Beduw. The *Heteym* rich in small cattle, have food enough in the desert, and the *Solubba* of their hunting and gipsy labour: for they are tinkers of kettles and menders of arms in the Beduin *menzils* . . . They are beside wood-workers in the desert acacia timber of rude saddle trees for the burden-camels and of the thelul saddle frames, of pulley reels (*mahal*) for drawing at any deeper wells of the desert, also of rude milk vessels and other such husbandry beside they are cattle surgeons, and in all their trade (only ruder of skill) like the smith's caste or *Sunna*. The *Solubba* obey the precept of their patriarch, who forbade them to be cattle-keepers and bade them live of their hunting in the wilderness. Beduins, otherwise little nice, will not willingly drink after *Solubbies* that might have eaten of some fulis, or the thing that is dead of itself. Also the Beduw say of them, "they eat of vile insects and worms": the last is fable, they eat no such vermin. Rashly the evil tongue of the Beduw rates them as "*Kuffar*," because only a few *Solubbies* can say the formal prayers, the Beduins themselves are not better esteemed in the towns . . . Homeborn, yet have they no citizenship in the Peninsular. No Beduw, they say, will rob a *Solubby*. This dispersed kindred of desert-men in Arabia, outgo the herdsmen Beduw in all landcraft, as much as these go before the tardy villagers. The *Solubba* (in all else ignorant wretches) have inherited a land-lore from sire to son, of the least finding-places of water. They wander upon the immense face of Arabia, from the height of Syria to el-Yemen, beyond et Taif, and I know not how much further! — and for things within their rat-like understanding, the Arabians tell me, it were of them that a man may best enquire. The *Solubba* or *Sleyb*, besides this proper name of their nation have some other which are epithets. West of Hayil they are more often called *el Khlua* or *Khehuy*, "the desolate," because they dwell apart from the Kabail. They are called as well in the spiteful tongue of this country *Kilab el-Khala* "hounds of the wilderness." *El-Ghruneny* is the name of another kindred of the *Sleyb* in East Nejd; and it is said they marry not with the former. The Arabians suppose them all to be come of some old Kafir kind or Nasara. Neither are the Sherarat and *Heteym* nomads (which are of one blood) reckoned to the Beduin tribes. The

dispersed kindreds of Sunna are other home-born aliens living amongst the Arab and there is no marrying between any of them. "Ma li hum asi," says the Beduw, "they are not of lineage," which can be understood to signify that "not descended of Kahtan, neither of the stock of Ishmael, they are not of the Arabs." And if any Arabians be asked, what then are they? They answer: "Wellah, we cannot tell, but they come of evil kin, be it Yahud or Nasara."

Further south in the Hadhramaut, W. H. Ingrams has come on other explanation for these folk whose name in those parts is identical with that used in the Somalilands. The following quotation is from page 44 of his 1936 report on the Hadhramaut, published as Colonial Office paper No. 123/1937:—

"The Subians form definitely the lowest class of the population. Some of them are agricultural labourers receiving wages or paid in kind, and there are settlements of them outside coastal towns like Mukalla and Shihr. When they are settled next door to a town they do the hewing of wood, the drawing of water, and perform such sanitary services as are carried out by sweepers in other eastern countries.

"I was informed that the word 'Subian' comes from 'Sabi' a boy. In the Hadhramaut they originate from the Wadi Hajr, and for this reason in the western part of the Protectorate are known as Hajris. They are said to be the descendants of the Abyssinian invaders of the third to sixth centuries A.D., and to have been reduced to their present lowly estate after the Abyssinians had been routed by the Persians on the intervention of Seif bin Dhi Yazan. This is the tale told in the Hadhramaut, and d'Arnaud recounts a similar story as the origin of the Khadims of Yemen and Aden. Neither slaves nor Subians can be the subjects of blood feuds."

It is interesting that in Somaliland there should be a similar tradition of the defeat of the Midgan, who were at one time a free hunting tribe on the borders of Hargeisa District. They appear to be equivalent to the Arabian Solubbies, and the Somali Tomals to the Sunna mentioned by Doughty. The lowest caste of all in Somaliland, the Yibbirs, appears to have no analogous caste in Arabia. In addition to hunting and performing menial duties in the towns they have certain specialized functions in the manufacture of charms particularly for fertility. Their women usually perform the clitoridotomy operation on the young Aji girls and act as midwives when they bear children. They have a certain traditional perquisite in the gift of a sheep when the first Aji child of a family is born.

It is curious that each of these outcaste groups has an exogamous dual organization of its own. Thus the Midgans are divided into Musa Dirir and Madiban, the Tomals into Ismam Gulaid and Ambur Gulaid, and the Yibbirs into Galaan and Adaan.

- (13) I had originally written "Galla tribes"; but changed it as likely to lead to confusion, since in physical type the Somalis differ very markedly from various "Galla" groups in Ethiopia some of whom have become crudely islamized. However, there appears to be throughout the Galla, Somali and Danakil groups a clear indication of a primitive exogamous dual organization of the tribes, which is still found among the Borana and in less degree among the Danakil, and in still less degree among the Somali.

Thus the Borana are divided into two cross-marrying groups of tribes, the Sabo and Gona, each with its chief, at present Gedo and Guyu Ana respectively: the Danakil are divided into the Adoimara and Assoimara groups each containing about 15 tribes, but strict cross-marriage is no longer practised. The Somali divisions

of Isahak and Darod are, I am convinced, but further examples of the same type of organization, which has been blurred and upset by contact with Islamic law and custom. The tradition of the arrival of Sheikh Isahak with 44 saints is curiously reminiscent of the Galla mythology in which Oglie and Atete (two subgods representing male and female principles) are each supported by 44 spirits. The idea of a Supreme Being whether Wak (Galla) or Allah (Somali Moslem) is identical. It would appear that the pagan Somali in pre-Islamic times were subjected to the same cultural influences as the Galla and developed on somewhat similar lines. Nevertheless, the "Galla" cairns called "talo" found in many parts of Somaliland all the way from Erigavo to the Northern Frontier District, coupled with the "Galla" wells seem to indicate co-operation from a rather larger group than is at present the normal Somali social unit. The present Somali grave is a small mound of earth or gravel with stones at the foot and head and a few stones set in rectangles at either side to indicate the number of children (even this latter is often omitted). This is a small labour compared with the great piled cairns some 50 yards long and 15 wide, which remain as the record of the Galla. A few clans are remembered as being of Galla origin though now grouped as Somali. Such are the Tur Yerr with the Dulbahanta Mohamed Gerad and among the Rer Musa Abokr, the Jebrahil among the Habr Yunis Rer Ainasheh, and the Gahaile in Erigavo. Some say that the Dulbahanta Khayad are Galla; but they themselves deny it furiously. Further south among such tribes as the Gurreh and the Rahanwen racial mixture is obvious from cultural, linguistic and physical indications. In general, in the north the references of the Somali to the people who occupied the country in early times are extremely vague. Even the tradition of the times of Imam Mohamed (Mohamed Gran) are almost entirely forgotten.

(14) A perusal of the confidential memorandum "Istruzione per l'applicazione dell'ordinamento giudiziario" issued by the Direzione superiore degli affari politici, i.e., the legal branch of the Italian secretariat, provides an interesting contrast between British and Italian administrative methods. The emphasis is upon two points:—

- (1) The decisions and procedure of native courts do not interest the central government until one party or another is left with a grievance and appeals. Residentes (District Officers) are advised to interfere as little as possible with the operations of native custom, and there is no occasion to take action at all if agreement between parties is reached in the native court.
- (2) When a question is eventually brought up to the District Officer, which requires settlement regarding conflicting claims which concern native custom, it is the duty of the officer to define the parties, the claims, the customs, the opinions of native authorities, the arguments and objections and to suggest a solution but not to give a decision. This is the responsibility of the Governor at headquarters.

The Italian policy thus tended to diminish the local officer to a mere clerk and to pile up all authority at headquarters where judges and secretaries could not keep pace with the work and so got hopelessly behind hand. The cause for this policy was the absence of an Italian administrative class with traditions of probity and responsibility. The same desire to centralize control was also probably responsible for the tendency to diminish the authority of local chiefs by splitting up their areas, and encouraging the claims of rivals as a countercheck to the authority of any one man.

(15) See A. T. Curle. "The Ruined Towns of Somaliland," *Antiquity*, September, 1937. There are also a considerable number of additional

- sites which he has not mentioned, for example, at Dirbiyo near Wadamugo on the Burao—Ainabo road, at Badwein, at Chetsalah near Badwein, Walamogi near Hudin, Kabur Ali near El Murir.
- (16) The *tariqas* are religious fraternities of whom the Qadarieh Ahmedieh and Salihieh are the most important in Somaliland. They extend throughout Islam, but Lammens "Islam Beliefs and Institutions" remarks: "The *tariqas* have really flourished only among the intellectually backward and in regions where anarchy reigns."
- (17) It must be realised that the method of grazing control is more likely to be successful if it be based on a policy of "keeping out" rather than "keeping in." What is meant by this is that it is quite impossible at times of extreme drought, as occasionally occur, to hold tribesmen within a fixed grazing area when the grazing and water are completely used up. That is the strict policy of "keeping in." The policy of "keeping out" is to encourage each tribe to close voluntarily for a period of two or more years a proportion of their grazing area, which, experience has shown, then tends to improve out of all recognition, and acts as a reserve for bad years. When I say "voluntarily," I mean with the approval of the chiefs and elders. There are always a proportion of anti-social individuals to whom compulsion must be applied to prevent them ruining things for the rest of the community. The value of the "keeping out" policy is shown by the generally much richer vegetation in the Haud and Ogaden than in the Ogo area. The two former areas were largely closed for long periods during the mullah wars between 1903 and 1920. Moreover, the fact that there are no wells on the Haud and flocks must depend on the rain-water ponds (*balis*), for water means that the Haud cannot be grazed during the dry season.
- (18) It is possible that the Sultan of the Habr Yunis may have been able to absorb some of the profits from incense caravans moving from the Dagahbur region towards Zeila and Berbera, since Habr Yunis grazing lies across these routes.

#### SHORT GLOSSARY OF SOMALI WORDS OF IMPORTANCE IN SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS.

It will be noted that while the language draws from Arabic for a number of its roots, it is itself capable of very fine distinctions of meaning particularly, of course, in names describing every possible variation of stock, of grazing and water. The glossary is arranged under subject headings for convenience of reference in the field. The indefinite article is attached by a hyphen to each word. Barry's *Elementary Somali Grammar* has been made use of as a check, and should be referred to for rules of elision in pronunciation, e.g., l+t=sh. Most of the words shown here are given in the exercises at various stages through that book, but a number of alternative Arabic and Darod words in common use have been added.

		SINGULAR		PLURAL
FAMILY	...	<i>rer-ki</i>	...	<i>rero-hi</i>
man	...	<i>nin-ki</i>	...	<i>niman-ki</i> , or <i>rag-gi</i> (collect.)
woman	...	<i>nag-ti</i>	...	<i>nagoh-hi</i> or <i>dumar-ki</i> (collect.)
people	...	—	...	<i>dad-ki</i> (collect.)
boy	...	<i>wil-ki</i>	...	<i>wilal-ki</i>
girl	...	<i>gabadi</i>	...	<i>gabdo-hi</i> or <i>hablo-hi</i> (collect.)

	SINGULAR	PLURAL
wife ... ..	<i>afo-di</i> ... ..	<i>afoyin-ki</i>
child ... ..	<i>anug-gi</i> (Darod word) .	<i>arur-ti</i>
orphan ... ..	<i>agon-ki</i> ... ..	<i>agona-di</i>
youth ... ..	<i>nin dalinyer</i> ... ..	<i>dalinyero-oi</i>
old woman ... ..	<i>islan-ti</i> ... ..	} <i>islano-hi</i>
old man ... ..	<i>islan-ki</i> ... ..	
elder ... ..	<i>odhe-gi</i> ... ..	<i>odheyal-ti</i>
father ... ..	<i>aba-hi</i> ... ..	<i>abayal-ti</i>
mother ... ..	<i>hoyo-di</i> ... ..	<i>hoyoyin-ki</i>
mother ... ..	<i>habr-ti</i> ... ..	<i>habroshin-ki</i>
parents ... ..	— ... ..	<i>wafed-ki</i>
son also child ... ..	<i>inan-ki</i> ... ..	} <i>inamo-hi</i>
daughter ... ..	<i>inan-ti</i> ... ..	
brother ... ..	<i>walal-ki</i> ... ..	} <i>walalo-di</i>
sister ... ..	<i>walal-ti</i> ... ..	
sept (i.e., group of families: subsection of clan) ... ..	<i>jilib-ki</i> ... ..	<i>jilibyo-di</i>
genealogy ... ..	<i>abtirsinyo-di</i> ... ..	—
descendants ... ..	— ... ..	<i>dal-ti</i>
blood ... ..	<i>dig-gi</i> ... ..	—
splitting up of sept or clan ... ..	<i>kalagur</i> or <i>kalatag</i> ... ..	—
close relation by blood ... ..	<i>ga'al-ki</i> ... ..	<i>ga'ala-di</i>
relation by blood ... ..	<i>higal-ki</i> ... ..	<i>higalo-di</i>
relation by marriage .	<i>hedid-ki</i> ... ..	<i>hedidye-di</i>
family by marriage (wife or husband speaking) ... ..	<i>has-ki</i> ... ..	—
father-in-law ... ..	<i>sodduk-ki</i> ... ..	<i>soddogyo-hi</i>
mother-in-law (wife's mother) ... ..	<i>soddo-di</i> ... ..	—
another man's wife ... ..	<i>soddo-di</i> ... ..	—
	identity of words here indicates strong tabu relationship	
mother's sister ... ..	<i>habr yer-ti</i> ... ..	—
	(lit. little mother)	
father's sister ... ..	<i>edu-di</i> ... ..	<i>edoyin-ki</i>
mother's brother ... ..	<i>abti-gi</i> ... ..	<i>abtiyalo-di</i> (whole of mother's family)
father's brother ... ..	<i>ader-ki</i> ... ..	<i>ilmo abti-gi</i>
mother's brother's son ... ..	<i>inan abti-gi</i> ... ..	<i>ilmo ader-ki</i>
father's brother's son .	<i>inan ader-ki</i> ... ..	—
mother's sister's son .	<i>habr wadak</i> ... ..	—

*Note.*—The *habr wadak* relationship is one of which the ordinary nan makes constant use. Affection tends to follow the matrilineal line while property and social status the patrilineal line.

	SINGULAR	PLURAL
father's sister's son ...	<i>inan edu, inan abti-gi .</i>	<i>ilmo edu</i>
grandfather ... ..	<i>awo-gi</i> ... ..	—
grandmother ... ..	<i>ayeyu-di</i> ... ..	—
female descent ... ..	<i>ba or baha</i> ... ..	<i>ayeyuyin-ki</i>

*Note.*—These distinctions of *Ba* and *Baha* are important in polygamous families and are frequently employed in speech. "*Ba*" means all the descendants of one particular wife of a man. It is, therefore, invariably followed in speech by her name or the name of her clan. "*Baha*" means all the rest of the children of that man and is, therefore, followed by the man's name. Thus in the "Habr Yunis" tribe the patriarch Ainasha (from whom are descended the Rer Ainasha) married a Jebrail woman whose two sons, Segulleh and Semater, had a large progeny. Thus they are known as the Habr Yunis Ba Jebrail, while the remainder of the descendants of Ainasha by the other wives (the Ba Basala, Ba Moon, and Bura At) are lumped together as the Habr Yunis Baha Ainasha. For outline genealogies of the chief tribal groups of British Somaliland see Lt.-Col. R. H. Smith's *Tribes of British Somaliland* printed at Caxton Press, Aden, 1941.

	SINGULAR	PLURAL
POSSESSIONS		
(all sorts, including stock) ... ..	—	<i>adunki or nol-ki</i>
house (general word) .	<i>aqal-ki</i> ... ..	<i>aqalo-di</i>
house, mud and wattle flat-roofed ... ..	<i>arish-ki</i> ... ..	<i>arishyo-di</i>
house, stone or brick, limewash ... ..	<i>dar-ti</i> ... ..	<i>daro-hi</i>
house, matting tent or hut ... ..	<i>guri-gi</i> ... ..	<i>guryo-hi</i>

*Note.*—The connection between this word *Guri* (which used in connection with a man's name means "all his huts and chattels" hence by extension a village; while used with a woman's name it means "a single hut") and *Gur*—marriage. *Gurning* a related word means the packing and movement of the *guri* or caravan. *Gurso*—to marry means presumably literally "to get a house," or to "become a householder."

	SINGULAR	PLURAL
tent of a man or woman living in a group but referred to as distinct from that group, e.g., the hut of a <i>magan</i> living under protection, or of a wife living among her husband's relations (especially if he has two or more wives)	<i>gois-ki</i> ... ..	—

	SINGULAR	PLURAL
solitary hut of a man with but one wife living alone in the bush ... ..	jess-ki ... ..	—
engaged man's hut near or outside his future father-in-law's kraal (this is where the courting is done and the bride's vir- ginity examined) ...	ardah-hi ... ..	—
enclosure, camp ...	hero-di ... ..	heroyin-ki
enclosure for camels the sheep and goat enclosure in the mid- dle of the homestead	od-di ... ..	odo-hi
CHATTELS (of all sorts other than stock) ... ..	gulgul-ti ... ..	—
goods, kit, baggage ...	— ... ..	mot-ki
hoop-like tent poles of banded withies to carry the cover mats —of two kinds ...	— ... ..	alabo-di
mats for tents (see Note 2)	— ... ..	digo (large)
leather skin for hut	— ... ..	lol (small)
wall ... ..	lama-di ... ..	lama-hi
bed ... ..	sarir-ti ... ..	sariro-hi
blanket ... ..	busta-hi ... ..	bustayal-ti
bedding ... ..	— ... ..	gogol-ti
bedcover of silk ...	toraha ... ..	—
table ... ..	mes-ki ... ..	mesas-ki
decorated food container ... ..	sattiyo-di or durban	sattiyal-ti
box ... ..	sandug-i ... ..	sanaduq-di
key ... ..	muftah-hi ... ..	muftahyo-di
chair ... ..	kursi-gi ... ..	kurasi-di
hide of cattle or camel	san-ti ... ..	san-an-ti
skin of sheep or goat	harag-gi ... ..	haragyo-di
waterpot (of wood or basket work) ...	han-ki ... ..	hanan-ti
ordinary bucket ...	baldi-gi ... ..	baldiyal-ti
water bucket (of leather for well drawing) ... ..	wadan-ti ... ..	—
rope ... ..	hadig-gi ... ..	—
fire ... ..	dab-ki ... ..	dabab-ki
firewood ... ..	— ... ..	habo-di
charcoal ... ..	— ... ..	duhul-ti
charcoal firestand of soft stone or pottery	idan-ki or burjiko-hi or girgire-di	—
incense vessel of soft stone or pottery ...	dabkad-ki ... ..	dabkadyo-hi
incense, expensive ...	'ud ... ..	—

	SINGULAR	PLURAL
incense, cheap ...	luban ...	—
empty tin ...	dasad-di ...	dasado-hi
spoon ...	fandal-ki ...	fandalo-di
cooking pot (iron) ...	dis-ti or madiba ...	distye-di
cooking pot (pottery) .	deri-i ...	deryo-hi
broom ...	minfiq-i ...	minafiq-di
axe ...	fas-ki or gudino-di ...	fasas-ki
dagger ...	bilawa-hi (Arabic) ...	bilawayal-ti
	able-di ...	ablo-hi
	turi-di ...	turi-hi
knife ...	mind-di or mandil-ki .	mindiyohi
scabbard or sheath ...	gal-ki ...	galal-ki
comb ...	saqaf-ti ...	saqafo-hi
stock whip ...	jedal-ki or shabuk-ki (Arabic)	—
walking stick ...	ul-ti or bakhora (Arabic)	ulo-hi
shepherd's crook ...	hangol-ki ...	hangol-ti
saddle for horse or camel ...	kora-hi ...	koraval-ti
saddle cloth ...	shalmad-di ...	shalmado-hi
bit or bridle ...	hakama-hi or tijam (Arabic)	hakamayal-ti
stirrup ...	rakab-ki ...	rakabayal-ti
feed-bag ...	abud-di ...	—
headstall ...	shekamad-di ...	shekamado-hi
saddle-tree of 2 cross- ed sticks on camel's withers to attach girth strap below and load above ...	kal-ki ...	kalal-ti
saddle-tree of 4 crossed sticks, 2 on withers and 2 on crupper used as above ...	kabal-ki ...	kabalo-di
wooden camel bell ...	kor-ki ...	koror-ki
CLOTHES (of cloth) .	— ...	dar-ki
clothes (of leather)	— ...	—
women's ...	— ...	duh-hi
clothes (of leather)	— ...	—
men's ...	— ...	gairan-ki
man's loincloth of green or red cloth from waist to ankle	ma'wus-ki ...	ma'awis-ti
cloak ...	maro-di, tob (Arabic), ‡ tob—goh-hi	—
turban ...	emamat	—
foundation cap for turban ...	kulet ...	—
cheap cotton cloth ...	mahmudi ...	—
silk cloth ...	hafuni ...	—
shoe ...	kab-ti or muda'is ...	kaboh-hi
skirt ...	gogora-ki ...	gogora-di
smock ...	korda-di ...	kordado-hi
sheet used as chemise	gareis-ki ...	gareisyo-hi
belt (mam'a) ...	sun-ki ...	suman-ti



	SINGULAR	PLURAL
belt (woman's) made of rope ... ..	bokor-ki ... ..	bokoro-hi
virgin's belt ... ..	da'al-i ... ..	da'alo-hi
cloth worn by women to cover hair ... ..	magaram or mahabat	magarim
necklace of gold (usual method of putting wealth on deposit), two types:		
(1) flat plates ... ..	lazim ... ..	—
(2) spherical engraved bobbles ... ..	muriat ... ..	—
<b>FOOD</b> ... ..	sor-ti ... ..	—
milk ... ..	— ... ..	'ano-hi
sour milk beer ... ..	— ... ..	'ano danan
meat ... ..	hilib-ki ... ..	—
ghee ... ..	subag-gi ... ..	—
sorghum, millet, dhurra or jowari ... ..	— ... ..	hadud-di or masego-di
dates ... ..	— ... ..	timir-ti
vegetables or fruit ... ..	qotrad-di ... ..	—
rice ... ..	baris-ki ... ..	baris-ki
fish ... ..	kalun-ki ... ..	kalunyo-di
egg ... ..	ukun ... ..	—
accursed object that cannot be eaten or touched (e.g., animal died of itself) ... ..	bakti-gi Arabic haram	—
<b>MARRIAGE</b> ... ..	gur-ki ... ..	—
circumcision of males and subincision and sewing up of females, done for both sexes between the ages of 7—12 ... ..	— ... ..	gudnin or buri
virgin ... ..	bikirat ... ..	—
a girl looking for marriage ... ..	herin-ti or wangurdon	—
the arrangement ... ..	farsomo-di ... ..	—
betrothal payment (by fiancé to girl's father) ... ..	gebati-gi ... ..	—
an engaged girl ... ..	wa donontahai inan-ti	—
bride-price (payment by bridegroom to bride's father) ... ..	yarad-ki ... ..	yaradye-di
dowry (bride's father to bride) ... ..	dibaad-di ... ..	dibaadye-di
wedding ... ..	aros-ki ... ..	arosye-di
bridal cake of thrice boiled mince meat and spices ... ..	mokumat-di ... ..	mokumadi-hi
wedding present (from bridegroom to bride) ... ..	marrin ... ..	—
gift to mother-in-law ... ..	di'qo-di ... ..	di'qoyo-ki

	SINGULAR	PLURAL
marriage settlement on a woman by her husband ... ..	<i>mehr</i> ... ..	—
maintenance ... ..	<i>musuruf-ki</i> ... ..	—
pregnant ... ..	<i>riman-ti</i> ... ..	—
birth ... ..	<i>umul-ti</i> ... ..	<i>umulo-hi</i>
midwife ... ..	<i>umuliso-di</i> ... ..	<i>umulisoyin-ki</i>
menstruation ... ..	<i>'isu-di</i> ... ..	—
barren ... ..	<i>madales</i> ... ..	—
impotent ... ..	<i>gorbolan</i> ... ..	—
rape ... ..	<i>wa kubsadeye</i> ... ..	—
divorce ... ..	<i>furnin</i> ... ..	—
a woman separated from her husband by partial divorce .	<i>nakirad or nashiza</i> ... ..	—
a divorced woman ... ..	<i>aramal-ti</i> ... ..	—
a prostitute woman ... ..	<i>dillo-di</i> ... ..	—
gambling ... ..	<i>kamar</i> ... ..	—
vocal concert ... ..	<i>gabei</i> ... ..	—
minstrel ... ..	<i>gabai'a-gi</i> ... ..	—
song ... ..	<i>hess</i> ... ..	—
ululation by woman .	<i>mash herat</i> ... ..	—
dance ... ..	<i>ayar-ti</i> ... ..	—
drum ... ..	<i>gurban or tambur</i> ... ..	—
	(Arabic)	
dancing clown (animal imitator) ... ..	<i>bar adda</i> ... ..	—
feast at conclusion of schooling or at marriage ... ..	<i>gelbis-ti</i> ... ..	—
show of horsemanship, dancing and singing	<i>dibaltig</i> ... ..	—
marriage feast ... ..	<i>makdarra</i> ... ..	—

"Makdarra" is a much developed institution for as at a wedding feast everyone is expected to give presents to the bridegroom, the word has become corrupted to mean any feast (i.e., a free supply of tea, a few cakes and incense) where the guests are subjected to a friendly black-mail to extract alms from them by playing on their fears of being thought mean. This is a very popular institution with the poor and equally unpopular with the wealthy. (As a result of public petitioning in Burao this institution was banned by public notice.)

	SINGULAR	PLURAL
religious feast or birthday of the Prophet (a party of religious commemoration with hymn singing and tea drinking. It is often used as a cloak for the holding of a <i>makdarra</i> to give it a religious excuse) .	<i>maulid-di</i> ... ..	—
noise ... ..	<i>qailo-di</i> ... ..	—

	SINGULAR	PLURAL
method of guessing good or bad luck by numerical calculation working on the rosary or with stones, often regarded as extremely powerful guide as to future action ...	<i>fal-ki</i> or <i>rame</i> (Arabic)	—
charm consisting of Koranic text sewn up in leather envelope .	<i>hersi-gi</i> or <i>karatas-ti</i>	—
luck, good or bad ...	<i>nasib</i> ...	—
prayer ...	<i>salad-di</i> ...	—
washing before prayer	<i>weseysin</i> or <i>farahalo</i>	—
water flask, usually of wood, carried by men for ceremonial washing ...	<i>weso-di</i> or <i>hulo-di</i> ...	—
prayer mat ...	<i>masali-di</i> or <i>sujjad-di</i>	—
in general the whole series of words relating to the religion of Islam, have been absorbed practically unchanged into Somali usage, e.g.,		
rosary ...	<i>tusbah-hi</i> or <i>tasbih-hi</i>	—
religious preacher or teacher ...	<i>wadad-ki</i> or <i>mullah-hi</i> (Arabic)	—
one who is in the process of becoming a mullah ...	<i>au-ki</i>	—
evening prayer custom of religious zealots who meet in the mosque and shout the name of Allah till they are frenzied	<i>dikri</i> ...	—
THE SEA ...	<i>bad-di</i> ...	—
sailor ...	<i>bahri-gi</i> ...	<i>bahri-di</i>
ship ...	<i>markab-ki</i> ...	<i>marakib-ti</i>
dhow ...	<i>doni-di</i> ...	<i>doniyo-hi</i>
rowing boat ...	<i>sehemad-di</i> ...	<i>sehemado-hi</i>
anchor ...	<i>burosin-ki</i> ...	<i>burosinyo-di</i>
coast ...	<i>heb-ki</i> ...	—
sail ...	<i>shirag-i</i> ...	<i>shirago-di</i>
harbour ...	<i>marso-di</i> ...	<i>marsoyin-ki</i>
pier ...	<i>deked-ki</i> ...	<i>dekedo-hi</i>
island ...	<i>gasirad-di</i> ...	<i>gasirado-hi</i>
wind ...	<i>dubail-ti</i> ...	—
COMMERCE ...	<i>biashara-di</i> ...	—
business ...	<i>amur-ti</i> ...	<i>amuro-hi</i>
earnings ...	<i>hogst-gi</i> ...	—

	SINGULAR	PLURAL
money ... ..	—	la'ag-ti
change ... ..	—	nagad-ki
contract ... ..	heshis-ti	heshisyo-hi
cost ... ..	gana'-di	—
account, bill ... ..	hesab-ki	hesabo-di
partner ... ..	sharik-ki	shurukye-di
buy ... ..	ibso	—
sell ... ..	ibi	—
the townsfolk ... ..	—	rer magalo
the nomads of the interior, country folk .	—	rer miyi or badu or jangali
trader ... ..	bayamushteri-gi	bayamushteriyo-di
broker ... ..	dilal-ki	dilalin-ki
loan ... ..	amah-di	—
shop ... ..	das-ki or dukan-ki (Arabic)	dasas-ki
balance weight, scales	misan-ki	—
pound weight ... ..	rodol-ki (cf. A r a b measure of weight the rattle)	—
coffee or tea shop (Somalis chiefly drink tea) ... ..	maqayad-di	maqayadi-hi
debt (credit) ... ..	qan-ki	qaman-ki
interest on loan (prohibited by Moslem law) ... ..	riba-di	riboh-hi
wages ... ..	mushaharo-di	mushaharoyin-ki
advance of pay ... ..	takadimad-di	takadimado-hi
alms in the form of food or clothing to a Sab or destitute person ... ..	def-ti	defye-di
instalment ... ..	hafto-di	haftoyin-ki
protector of a Sab and hence by derivation protector of a trader in hostile country .	aban-ki	abana-di
protection ... ..	ilali	—
the stock as wealth ... ..	—	holo-hi
camel (general word) .	—	gel-i
male camel ... ..	aur-ti	auro-hi
riding camel ... ..	rakub-ki	rakub-ti
female camel ... ..	hal-ti	halo-hi
stallion camel ... ..	bargub-ki	bargubo-hi
castrated male camel with huge hump, fatted up for slaughter ... ..	gol-ki	golol-ti
barren female camel with huge hump, fatted up for slaughter ... ..	gol-ti	golol-ti
barren (stock) ... ..	galof	—

A list of about 50 words describing exactly the age, colouring, the type of every sort of camel is omitted, as they vary very much in each nomad confederacy.

	SINGULAR	PLURAL
cattle ... ..	—	loh-hi
bull ... ..	dibi-gi	dibi-di
cow ... ..	sa-ti	sahi-hi
sheep ... ..	—	idoh-hi
ram ... ..	sumal-ki	sumalad-di
male castrated sheep .	wan-ki	wanan-ki
young female sheep ...	saben-ti	sabeni-hi
breeding sheep (ewe) .	lah-di	laho-hi
hen ... ..	doro	—
cock ... ..	dik	—
goats ... ..	—	riyo-hi
billy goat ... ..	urg-gi	urgiyo-hi
breeding female goat .	ri-di	riyo-hi
donkey, male (jack- ass) ... ..	damer-ki	damero-di
donkey, female (she- ass) ... ..	damer-ti	damero-di
mule, male ... ..	bagal-ki	—
mule, female ... ..	bagal-ti	—
horse ... ..	faras-ki	farda-hi
mare ... ..	genyo-di	genyoyin-ki
foot-track of man or animal ... ..	rad-ki	radad-ki
contract of hire of: one month's drinking of a camel's milk ...	biltan	—
one day's milk turn and turn about with the owner of the camel ... ..	ashatan	—
herding fee to magan for services render- ed, or tip to a ser- vant for his trouble	ta'ab-ki or ajuro-di	—
deposit of stock with magan by protector	abal gud	—
strayed stock ... ..	badi-di	—
reward for informa- tion leading to re- covery of stock ...	badifad-di	badifado-hi
description of charac- teristics of an animal	—	tilman-ti
camel brand peculiar to each clan (some- times used on grave- stones—Ogaden cus- tom) ... ..	sumad-di	—
journey ... ..	safar-ki	safaro-di
thirst ... ..	harad	—
grazing area of clan ...	daq	—
camelman ... ..	aurkarale	—
men's work of grazing camels far out on the steppe ... ..	hergeye or fof	—
women's and child- ren's work of graz- ing sheep and goats near home ... ..	dajin	—

	SINGULAR	PLURAL
brushwood shelter		
from the wind ...	<i>duksi-gi</i> ...	—
the fly ...	<i>duqsi-gi</i> ...	—
the milking ...	<i>lisnin</i> ...	—
take the stock to		
water ...	<i>arori</i> ...	—
the watering at wells	<i>doultis</i> ...	—
to water stock ...	<i>worabis</i> ...	—
water ...	<i>biyo-hi*</i> ...	—
watering party coming		
into the wells ...	<i>dan-ki</i> ...	<i>daman-ki</i>
watering trough of		
leather ...	<i>nar-ki</i> ...	—
well ...	<i>'el-ki</i> ...	—
rainwater pool ...	<i>bali-gi</i> ...	—
artificial pond or		
drinking trough of		
stone or cement ...	<i>barked-di</i> ...	—
wayside pool ...	<i>jiddan-ki</i> ...	—
flood water ...	<i>dad-ki</i> ...	—
place flooded by rain	<i>doho-di</i> ...	—
bitter water (as of		
wells in Nogal valley)	<i>qadad-ki</i> ...	—
river or river bed ...	<i>tug-gi</i> ...	—
running water ...	<i>durdur-ki</i> ...	—
rain water ...	<i>hared-ki</i> ...	—
rain ...	<i>rob-ki</i> ...	—
sun ...	<i>qorah-di</i> ...	—
moon or month ...	<i>bil-ti</i> (crescent) ...	—
	<i>dayah-hi</i> (full) ...	—
star ...	<i>hedig-gi</i> ...	—
	(Arabic <i>najm</i> )	

\*Note.—Similarity of root to Galla word *bishan*—water. The root *bi* is probably identical with the nilotic root *pi* for water found throughout nilotic and nilo-hamitic languages.

	SINGULAR	PLURAL
THE COUNTRY ...	<i>dul-ki</i> ...	<i>dulul-ki</i>
the bush (general		
word) ...	<i>qain-ki</i> ...	—
district ...	<i>wadan-ki</i> ...	<i>wadano-di</i>
grass ...	— ...	<i>gedo-hi</i>
new grass after rain	— ...	<i>dog-gi</i> or <i>nak</i>
dry grass or straw ...	— ...	<i>aus-ki</i>
drought ...	<i>abar-ti</i> ...	—
heat ...	<i>kulail-ki</i> ...	—
cold ...	<i>dahan-ti</i> ...	—
mud ...	— ...	<i>dobo-di</i>
dust ...	— ...	<i>sigo-di</i>
soil ...	— ...	<i>amud-di</i>
hill ...	<i>bur-ti</i> ...	<i>buro-hi</i>
low isolated hill in the		
plain ...	<i>gumbur-ti</i> ...	<i>gumburo-hi</i>
plain ...	<i>ban-ki</i> ...	<i>banan-ki</i>

	SINGULAR	PLURAL
village ... ..	bulo or <i>karia</i> (Arabic) <i>guri-gi</i> (often used loosely in this sense)	—
group of hamlets, camped together ... ..	<i>degmo-di</i> ... ..	—
town ... ..	<i>magalo-di</i> ... ..	—
tented quarter of the town ... ..	<i>harfa-di</i> ... ..	—
road ... ..	<i>waddo-di</i> ... ..	<i>waddoyin-ki</i>
street ... ..	<i>surin-ki</i> ... ..	<i>surino-di</i>
track or path ... ..	<i>wadiqo-di</i> ... ..	<i>wadiqoyin-ki</i>
garden ... ..	<i>ber-ti</i> ... ..	—
WAR ... ..	<i>haraba-di</i> ... ..	—
attack ... ..	<i>werar</i> ... ..	—
fight ... ..	<i>dagal-ki</i> ... ..	—
to fight ... ..	<i>dirir</i> or <i>len</i> ... ..	—
feud ... ..	<i>ollad-di</i> ... ..	—
scout ... ..	<i>ilal-ki</i> ... ..	<i>ilalo-hi</i>
raid ... ..	<i>dulaan</i> ... ..	—
raiding party ... ..	<i>'oll</i> ... ..	—
provisions for journey to graze horses by night, or to attack by night ... ..	<i>je'isin-ki</i> ... ..	—
loot ... ..	<i>mir</i> ... ..	—
to loot stock ... ..	<i>daa</i> ... ..	—
to slaughter by cutting throat ... ..	<i>afgub</i> ... ..	—
to kill ... ..	<i>gaura</i> ... ..	—
weapon (singular or plural) ... ..	<i>dile</i> ... ..	—
rifle ... ..	<i>hub-ki</i> ... ..	—
pistol ... ..	<i>banduq-i</i> (or <i>midfa'i</i> ) ... ..	<i>banaduq-di</i>
bandolier ... ..	<i>tumujad-di</i> ... ..	<i>tumujado-hi</i>
bullet (singular or plural) ... ..	<i>shekad-di</i> ... ..	<i>shekado-hi</i>
wound ... ..	<i>risas-ti</i> ... ..	—
bloodthirsty ... ..	<i>nabar-ki</i> or <i>quon-ti</i> ... ..	—
castrate ... ..	<i>digya'ab</i> ... ..	—
taking a man's life ... ..	<i>dufan</i> ... ..	—
spear ... ..	<i>naf go-dei</i> ... ..	—
shield ... ..	<i>waran-ki</i> ... ..	—
the fighting men of the clan ... ..	<i>gashan-ki</i> ... ..	—
a fighting alliance ... ..	<i>gashanqad-ki</i> ... .. (lit. "shield carriers")	—
non-combatants of the clan (women and children) ... ..	<i>gashanbur</i> ... .. (lit. "big shield")	—
thief ... ..	— ... ..	<i>mato-di</i>
highway robber ... ..	<i>tug-gi</i> ... ..	<i>tugag-gi</i>
	<i>bud'ad-ki</i> (pronounced <i>barad-ki</i> ) [lit. club ( <i>bud</i> ) white ( <i>'ad</i> ) because he sits in the white dust of the highway waiting for victims]	—

	SINGULAR	PLURAL
peace embassy ...	<i>ergo-di</i> ...	—
peace meeting ...	<i>wa'ad</i> or <i>musalaha</i> ...	—
frontier ...	<i>had-ki</i> ...	<i>hadad-ki</i>
JUSTICE ...	<i>haq</i> ...	—
tribal court ...	<i>shir-ki</i> ...	—
custom ...	<i>her-ki</i> ...	—
elder, man of importance ...	<i>wayel-ki</i> ...	—
government headman ...	<i>akil-ki</i> ...	—
assistant headman (one who answers questions) ...	<i>jawabdar-ki</i> ...	—
complainant of any sort ...	<i>mushtaki-gi</i> ...	—
to importune ...	<i>qatesin</i> ...	—
name ...	<i>maga-i</i> ...	<i>magayo-di</i>
judge, magistrate ...	<i>hakin-ki</i> ...	—
officer ...	<i>sirkal-ki</i> ...	<i>sirakil-ti</i>
constable or soldier ...	<i>askar-ki</i> ...	<i>askar-ti</i>
handcuffs ...	<i>habbidi-gi</i> ...	—
plaintiff ...	<i>mudi'i-gi</i> ...	<i>mudi'iyal-ti</i>
defendant ...	<i>muda'ali-gi</i> ...	<i>muda'aliyal-ti</i>
witness ...	<i>marqati-gi</i> ...	<i>marqatiyal-ti</i>
interpreter ...	<i>turjoman-ki</i> ...	—
clerk ...	<i>karani-gi</i> ...	—
court case ...	<i>kes-ki</i> or <i>da'awad-di</i> ...	—
to swear ...	<i>daro</i> ...	—
the truth ...	<i>run-ti</i> ...	—
the lie ...	<i>ben-ti</i> ...	—
to deny responsibility for an action which one has done, and it is known that one has done ...	<i>dafr</i> ...	—
to have something against a person ...	<i>kugaudi</i> ...	—
to worry maliciously ...	<i>adib</i> ...	—
advice ...	<i>talo-di</i> ...	—
a slap in the face ...	<i>dirbah</i> ...	—
honour, reputation ...	<i>namus</i> or <i>heshimat</i> (Arabic) ...	—
compensation as apology for insult ...	<i>haal</i> ...	—
accidentally ...	<i>kama'</i> ...	—
purposely ...	<i>baded</i> ...	—
question ...	<i>sual-ti</i> ...	<i>sualo-hi</i>
answer ...	<i>jawab-ti</i> ...	<i>jawabo-hi</i>
judgment ...	<i>hukum-ki</i> ...	—
punishment ...	<i>taqsir-ti</i> ...	—
fine ...	<i>qasirad-di</i> ...	—
prison ...	<i>habsi-gi</i> ...	<i>habsi-di</i>
the whip for flogging ...	<i>kurbash-ki</i> ...	—
compensation for wounding ...	<i>jaifo</i> ...	—
blood money ...	<i>mag</i> or <i>diya</i> (Arabic) ...	—
full blood money (100 camels) ...	<i>mag dan</i> ...	—



	SINGULAR	PLURAL
woman's blood money (50 camels) ...	<i>mag nagod</i> ...	—
close relatives share (of payment or receipt) of blood money ...	<i>jiffo</i> ...	—
distant relatives' share	<i>gobane</i> ...	—
standard value camel (worth nine female sheep) ...	<i>sagali</i> ...	—
written petition (one of the unfortunate legacies of Indian administration) ...	<i>erji-gi</i> ...	—
<b>DEATH</b> ...	<i>demasho</i> ...	—
grave ...	<i>hawal-ti or habal-ti</i> ...	—
corpse ...	<i>mayid-ki</i> ...	—
prayer for dead at de- parting ...	<i>sura yassin</i> ...	—
bury ...	<i>'as</i> ...	—
shroud ...	<i>kafan</i> ...	—
headstones ...	<i>geiski habasha</i> ...	—
wailing ...	<i>oweihin</i> ...	—
inheritance ...	<i>dahal</i> ...	—
mortmain (religious gift to assist main- tenance of a mosque or tariqa) ...	<i>waqf</i> ...	—
<b>PLACES.</b> (Somali names for well-known places which differ from the usual.)		
Berbera ...	<i>Sahil (lit. Coast)</i>	
Harar ...	<i>Adari or Adali</i>	
Mogadishu ...	<i>Hamar</i>	
Bandar Kassim ...	<i>Busaso</i>	
Aden (Steamer Point)	<i>Tawali</i>	